



TOWARD AN INTEGRATED TAX TREATMENT OF GIFTS AND 
INHERITANCES 
Alana J. Darnell∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the 
“2001 Tax Act” or the “Act”)1 crafted the most dramatic changes in 
the tax treatment of gifts and inheritances since the adoption of the 
estate tax in 1916.2  The 2001 Tax Act, signed by President George W. 
Bush on June 7, 2001, is sweeping in its impact and provides for 
perhaps the most interesting sunset3 in tax legislative history.4  
Beginning in 2002, and continuing through 2009, the 2001 Tax Act 
gradually reduces estate and generation-skipping taxes5 through rate 
reduction and by increasing the amount of the unified credit 
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 1 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter 2001 Tax Act]. 
 2 Id.  Section 2001 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on “the transfer 
of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United 
States.”  I.R.C. § 2001 (2003).  An estate tax  “falls on the net assets of a deceased 
individual, as opposed to an inheritance tax, which falls on the heir, or a gift tax, 
which applies only to living donors.”  Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers: The Moral 
Case Against the Death Tax, 85 TAX NOTES 1429, 1430 (1999). 
 3 “Sunset law” is defined as “[a] statute under which a governmental agency or 
program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally 
renewed.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (7th ed. 1999). 
 4 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, § 901. 
 5  A [generation-skipping tax] is imposed on all transfers, made either 
directly or through a trust or similar arrangement to remote 
generations (generally, bypassing children in favor of grandchildren) 
as though the assets had been transferred to each succeeding 
generation (that is, from parents to children and from children to 
grandchildren).  Essentially, the [generation-skipping tax] imposes a 
flat tax at the maximum estate tax rate . . . on cumulative transfers 
deemed to be inter-generational, subject to an inflation-adjusted 
exemption. 
Charles P. Rettig, The Life and Death of Estate Taxes, 24 L.A. LAW. 32, 34 (Nov. 2001). 
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exemption.6  To the delight of estate tax opponents, the 2001 Tax Act 
provides for a complete elimination of the estate tax in 2010.7  To the 
consternation of these same estate tax opponents, however, the estate 
tax returns to its pre-2001 Tax Act form in 2011.8  The sunset was 
necessary in order to keep the overall cost of the 2001 Tax Act within 
President Bush’s target of $1.35 trillion in overall tax reduction.9 
The 2001 Tax Act’s treatment of the gift tax is more limited.  
The Act dictates a one-time increase in the gift tax exemption to $1 
million in 2002 and reduces the gift tax rates, along with the estate 
tax and generation-skipping tax rates, through 2009.10  Congress 
retained the gift tax in 2010 to avert a massive shift in wealth to 
younger generations before the return of the estate tax in 2011.11  
Since the 2001 Tax Act calls for the repeal of the estate tax for only 
one year, Congress feared that if it repealed the gift tax in the same 
year, individuals would take advantage of this tax-free year and gift 
 
 6 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, § 511 (authorizing the reduction in tax rates); id. § 
521 (authorizing the increase in exclusion amounts).  The Internal Revenue Code 
dictates that “a credit of the applicable credit amount shall be allowed to the estate of 
every decedent against the tax imposed by § 2001.”  I.R.C. § 2010 (2003). 
 7 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521. 
 8 Id. § 901.  In other words, without further legislation, the 2001 Tax Act does 
not apply after December 31, 2010.  Jack MacGregor Campbell, The 2001 Tax Cuts 
‘Sunset’—But Didn’t Have To. Here’s Why, 95 TAX NOTES 623, 623 (2002).  Some 
commentators believe the sunset provision was enacted to guarantee compliance 
with the Congressional Budget Act and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. §§ 602-692 (2000)).  
Campbell, supra, at 624. 
 9 Glenn Kessler & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Passes $1.35 Trillion Tax Cut; 
Lawmakers Hand Bush A Big Legislative Victory, WASH. POST, May 21, 2001, at A01 
(“[T]o keep the overall cost within the 11-year, $1.35 trillion framework required by 
the congressional budget outline, many . . . parts of the plan are delayed . . . .”).  The 
2001 Tax Act sunsets in 2011, an “accounting maneuver that kept the cost below 
$1.35 trillion and allowed a deal to be struck.”  Id.  Yet, the “tax law passed with the 
euphoria of large budget surpluses.  With the economic slowdown, these budget 
surpluses have vanished.  The change in economic forecasts make the freezing or 
modification of the new tax very likely.”  Estate Tax ‘Repeal’ Not Really Reform, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2001, at E-3.  When the 2001 Tax Act passed, 
“markets were sky high, the budget was inching back into surplus because of a 
healthy economy, and Republicans wanted to reward wealthy contributors.”  James 
O. Goldsborough, Permanent Estate-Tax Repeal Bad Fiscal Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 13, 2002, at B13; see D. Mark Wilson & William W. Beach, The Economic 
Impact of President Bush’s Tax Relief Plan (discussing the economic effects of the 2001 
Tax Act), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/CDA01-01.cfm (Apr. 27, 
2001) (on file with author). 
 10 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521. 
 11 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of potential tax 
avoidance associated with gift tax repeal. 
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substantial assets,12 resulting in significantly reduced estates subject to 
taxation upon the return of the estate tax to its pre-2001 Tax Act 
level.13 
Another important 2010 tax event is that the Act adopts a 
carryover basis for bequests and inheritances, replacing the current 
system that uses the fair market value at date of death to determine 
the basis of inherited property.14  This change to a carryover basis for 
inheritances removes the bias that existed in favor of bequests at 
death, rather than gifts during life.15 
The President has called on Congress to make permanent the 
repeal of the estate tax.16  In calling for permanent repeal, however, 
the President has remained silent on whether a repeal of the gift tax 
should be pursued.17  Nor do any of the current proposals mention 
the income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances under § 102 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“§ 102”)18—a provision untouched by the 
2001 Tax Act.19  Section 102 specifically excludes gifts and 
inheritances from the recipient’s gross income; thus, such recipients 
do not include the value of gifts and inheritances in their income 
base.20  This disconnect between the income tax treatment and the 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Compare I.R.C. § 1014 (2003), with 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 541, 542 
(replacing a fair market value basis with a carryover basis).  For example, Jane Doe 
purchases 100 shares of stock in XYZ for $100 in 1980.  In 2010, Jane Doe dies 
leaving the stock to her son, John.  In 2010, the value of the 100 shares of stock is 
$5,000.  In a carryover basis regime, the basis in the stock would be transferred from 
Jane to John; thus, John’s basis in the stock would be $100.  Yet, under a fair market 
value basis system, the fair market value basis would be $5,000.  If John later sells the 
stock for $6,000, he would either be taxed on $5,900 in a carryover basis system or 
$1,000 in a fair market value basis system. 
 15 Krisanne M. Schlachter, Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen 
and How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System, 19 VA. TAX REV. 781, 783 (2000). 
 16 President Bush hopes to permanently repeal the estate tax.  Joel Friedman, 
Estate Tax Repeal Would Be Costly, Yet Benefit Only a Few, 95 TAX NOTES 1984, 1984 
(2002).  Furthermore, the House introduced a bill entitled the “Permanent Death 
Tax Repeal Act of 2003” to the House on January 7, 2003.  H.R. 139, 108th Cong. § 2 
(2003).  The same bill was introduced to the Senate on January 15, 2003.  S. 169, 
108th Cong. § 2 (2003).  The House passed another bill, “The Death Tax 
Permanency Act of 2003,” to permanently repeal the estate tax.  H.R. 57, 108th 
Cong. § 2 (2003).  “Because he [President Bush] enjoys narrow but probably 
adequate majorities in both houses of Congress, it would seem at this point that 
repeal is more likely than not.”  Richard Schmalbeck, The Death of the ‘Death Tax’?, 48 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 749, 749 (2000). 
 17 See Friedman, supra note 16, at 1984. 
 18 I.R.C. § 102(a) (2003). 
 19 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1. 
 20 Id. 
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transfer tax treatment of gifts and inheritances is surprising since a 
longstanding justification for the exclusion of gifts and inheritances 
from gross income is the existence of the transfer tax.21  Future 
legislation making the estate tax repeal permanent is a certainty.  
Consideration of permanent repeal will necessitate a reexamination 
of the income tax treatment of gifts and inheritances in order to 
ensure a comprehensive tax structure for wealth transfers. 
The focus of this Comment is the overall tax treatment of gifts 
and inheritances in an estate tax-free world, should the repeal of the 
estate tax in 2010 become permanent.  Specifically, it asks whether 
the exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the recipient’s gross 
income under § 102 should continue in an environment free of 
wealth transfer taxes.  Secondly, this Comment addresses whether 
Congress should repeal the gift tax given the policy justifications 
supporting the repeal of the estate tax.  Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that should the estate tax repeal be made permanent, 
Congress should repeal both the gift tax and the exclusion of gifts 
and inheritances from the recipient’s gross income.  Thus, the 
recipient (rather than the transferor) would be responsible for the 
payment of a tax on all gifts and inheritances received.22 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the tax treatment 
of gifts and inheritances.  Part II reviews the historical arguments for 
and against estate and gift taxes.  Part III explains the 2001 Tax Act 
and the changes it dictates.  Part IV contends that should Congress 
decide to make the repeal of the estate tax permanent, consistent tax 
policy requires a repeal of the gift tax as well.  More importantly, a 
permanent repeal of the estate and gift taxes should be coupled with 
the repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances 
under § 102.  This Comment determines that no rationale exists for a 
gift tax other than safeguarding a future tax base should a 
permanently repealed estate tax prove to be less than permanent.  
Moreover, it maintains that the permanent repeal of the estate tax, 
along with gift tax repeal, requires a reexamination of the 
justifications for excluding gifts and inheritances from gross income.  
This Comment concludes that sound tax policy necessitates § 102 
repeal.  Further, it reveals that the principles underlying the gift tax 
and income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances collapse without 
 
 21 Stephen Vasek, Death Tax Repeal: Alternative Reform Proposals, 92 TAX NOTES 955, 
961 (2001). 
 22 Actually, the tax would be paid on all gifts and inheritances received above a 
certain exemption amount.  See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text for a 
suggested exemption amount. 
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the added justification of an estate tax. 
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF GIFTS AND 
INHERITANCES UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
Although the modern estate tax came into existence in 1916, 
efforts to impose some tax on the transfer of wealth dates back almost 
to the founding of our nation.23  In 1797, for example, Congress 
imposed a stamp tax or duty on legacies and intestate shares of 
personalty.24  For the most part, however, Congress did not consider 
levies on such wealth transfers until the fiscal demands of the Civil 
War drastically increased the need for funds.25 
This increased need for revenue led to the first American 
income tax26 in 1861.27  This original income tax, however, excluded 
gifts.28  One year later, Congress nullified this tax29 in favor of another 
income tax and separate inheritance tax.30  In 1864, as revenue needs 
 
 23 William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word 
“Gift,” 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 229-31, 235-36 (1963) (discussing early income taxes); 
see MAX WEST, THE INHERITANCE TAX 87 (1908) (discussing the history and policy 
underlying inheritance taxes); Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 
in FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 819 (Joint Comm. Print 
1955) (tracing the estate and gift taxes by the government’s need for revenue). 
 24 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (effective 1798-1802) [hereinafter Stamp 
Act].  “Personalty” is defined as “[p]ersonal property as distinguished from real 
property.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (7th ed. 1999).  See Eisenstein, supra note 
23, at 820, for a discussion of the Stamp Act.  The Stamp Act was a form of a death 
tax because federal stamps were required on wills offered for probate, inventories 
and letters of administration, and receipts and discharges from legacies and intestate 
distributions of property.  Barry W. Johnson & Martha Britton Eller, Federal Taxation 
of Inheritance and Wealth Transfers 3, 4, at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats 
/article/0,,id=106176,00.html (Mar. 2001) (on file with author).  After the naval war 
with France ended and the need for revenue decreased, Congress repealed the 
Stamp Act.  Id. 
 25 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1954).  During 
America’s early history, congressional debates focused on the proper tax system, i.e., 
income or inheritance tax, and the proper rates, rather than center on the scope of 
the tax.  Klein, supra note 23, at 231.  During this time period, Klein suggests that gift 
taxation was not a pressing issue.  Id.; see C. Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal 
Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 538 (1940) (stating that “there were no debates with 
scholarly discussion of the pros and cons of alternative methods of taxing or not 
taxing gifts,” but noting that the essential issues were presented to Congress). 
 26 An “income tax” is “a tax on an individual’s or entity’s net income.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (7th ed. 1999). 
 27 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (effective 1861); PAUL, supra note 
25, at 9; see Harriss, supra note 25, at 531 (discussing the first income tax). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Klein, supra note 23, at 231 (noting that the first income tax in 1861 “was so 
badly drafted” that the government “did nothing to enforce it”). 
 30 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 473, 485 (effective 1862-1863); Klein, 
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again mounted, inheritance tax rates increased and Congress 
adopted a succession tax on gifts conveying real property, thereby 
establishing the first gift tax.31 
Following the Civil War, Congress abolished both the income tax 
and inheritance tax.32  Even though there was little debate regarding 
the repeal of the inheritance tax in the House of Representatives, 
“there seemed to be no widespread objection to these taxes.”33  
Although Congress repealed the inheritance tax, Congress generally 
viewed the inheritance tax as “just and equitable.”34  Yet, Congress 
posited that it was inequitable to tax direct heirs when the 
government’s need for revenue was minimal.35  Congress also 
abolished the inheritance tax because of administrative feasibility 
concerns regarding collection.36  The driving force leading to the 
repeal of both the income tax and inheritance tax, however, was 
largely the government’s decreased need for revenue.37 
The need for revenue, and a desire to provide a more equitable 
tax burden, brought income and estate taxes to Congress’s attention 
once again in 1894.38  In that year, Congress, responding to political 
pressure from Populists, reformers and intellectuals, passed an 
 
supra note 23, at 231 (stating that gifts that took effect after the Civil War were 
included in the inheritance tax).  An “inheritance tax” is “a tax imposed on a person 
who inherits property from another (unlike an estate tax, which is imposed on the 
decedent’s estate).”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (7th ed. 1999).  See SIDNEY 
RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION 73-77 (1942), for an overview of tax policy after the 
Civil War.  See generally WILLIAM J. SCHULTZ, THE TAXATION OF INHERITANCE 98-167 
(1926), for a discussion of taxes on inheritances. 
 31 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 285, 288 (effective 1864) [hereinafter 
1864 Act]; RATNER, supra note 30, at 88 (discussing the 1864 Act).  “The 1864 Act, 
although altered by subsequent legislation, introduced several features, which later 
formed the foundation of the modern transfer tax system.”  Johnson & Eller, supra 
note 24, at 6.  For example, “[s]ome of these features included the exemption of 
small estates, the taxation of certain lifetime transfers that were testamentary in 
nature, and the special treatment of bequests to the surviving spouses.”  Id. 
 32 RATNER, supra note 30, at 121-27, 129 (discussing the debate following the Civil 
War regarding the preservation of taxes). 
 33 Id. at 128. 
 34 Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted) (“Nevertheless, these justifications for 
the inheritance taxes failed to prevent their elimination from the federal revenue 
system at a time when capitalism in America was receiving a new impetus, and when 
some corrective or restriction on the undue concentration of wealth was needed.”). 
 35 Id. at 128. 
 36 Id. at 128-29 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3495, 4073, 4708 
(1870)). 
 37 Eisenstein, supra note 23, at 821. 
 38 Klein, supra note 23, at 232 (stating that the Populists, reformers, and 
intellectuals favored a tax on the rich). 
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income tax and an inheritance tax.39  This time, Congress passed 
legislation that included gifts and inheritances of personal property 
in gross income.40  Some commentators suggest that Congress viewed 
the tax on gifts as an inheritance tax, rather than an income tax, but 
included gifts in income for convenience.41  This income tax, 
however, was short lived: in 1895, the Supreme Court declared in 
Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.42 that the tax was 
unconstitutional.43 
Unable to impose an income tax, but badly in need of revenue 
to fund the Spanish American War effort, Congress imposed a tax on 
recipients of transfers of personal property in 1898.44  The 1898 
“Death Tax” was in effect a “modified estate duty,” rather than an 
inheritance tax.45  Instead of increasing with the size of the recipient’s 
share, as would be typical of an inheritance tax, the tax rates 
accelerated “as the size of the estate increased.”46  Although the 1898 
tax did not contain a general tax on gift transfers, it did contain a 
provision imposing a tax on gifts that took effect after the death of 
the donor.47  Congress repealed the tax in 1902 upon the conclusion 
of the war.48 
In 1913, with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
Congress had unfettered discretion to build almost any tax system it 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (effective 1894-1895) 
[hereinafter 1894 Act].  See WEST, supra note 23, at 94, for a discussion of the 1894 
Act. 
 41 Klein, supra note 23, at 231-33.  The 1894 tax rates were not progressive, but 
rather consisted of a 2-percent flat tax above $4,000, with no separate estate tax.  Id.  
This system essentially resulted in a tax on income, along with a separate tax on gifts 
and inheritances.  Id. 
 42 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding the income tax unconstitutional under Article I, 
Section 9, of the United States Constitution). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448, 464-66 (effective 1898-1902) 
[hereinafter 1898 Death Tax].  See Klein, supra note 23, at 234, for a discussion of 
the 1898 Death Tax.  See also PAUL, supra note 25, at 32-39, for a detailed analysis of 
the Populist movement. 
 45 Klein, supra note 23, at 234. 
 46 Id.  For a thorough analysis of the 1898 Death Tax, see RATNER, supra note 30, 
at 234, WEST, supra note 23, at 94-95, and PAUL, supra note 25, at 65-68. 
 47 Klein, supra note 23, at 234 (noting that the treatment of gifts in the 1898 
Death Tax “followed the precedent of the Civil War legislation”). 
 48 Act of April 12, 1902, ch. 500, 32 Stat. 96 (1902) (repealing 1898 Death Tax); 
Klein, supra note 23, at 235 (discussing the repeal of the 1898 Death Tax).  Before 
Congress repealed the tax, the Supreme Court upheld the tax in Knowlton v. Moore, 
178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
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saw fit to create.49  It began with the income tax.50  Importantly, this 
income tax excluded gifts, bequests, devises, and descents from gross 
income.51  Gifts and inheritances were not subject to a transfer tax at 
this time.52  Interestingly, Senator Norris proposed an amendment to 
adopt an estate tax in order to break up concentrations of wealth.53  
Although the amendment had little opposition in Senate debates, the 
Senate defeated it along with an amendment for an inheritance tax.54  
One commentator suggests that Congress was not necessarily 
opposed to an estate tax, but rather members of Congress who would 
have supported an estate tax “did not want to divert their own and 
their colleagues’ attention from the main issue—‘income’ taxation.”55 
War would once again resurrect the estate tax.56  In 1916, 
Congress found itself looking for other revenue sources to fund the 
increased expenditures caused by World War I.57  Congressman 
Cordell Hull, a longtime supporter of breaking up concentrations of 
wealth, proposed a tax bill that included an estate tax.58  During 
congressional hearings on the hill, the House Ways and Means 
Committee criticized the then-current tax system and stated that 
persons “deriving the most benefit and protection from the 
government” should account for a larger percentage of the 
government’s revenue.59  The Committee also added that the estate 
 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI  (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the 
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”); see RATNER, supra 
note 30, at 298-320 (discussing the proposal and ratification of the sixteenth 
amendment).  Congress passed the sixteenth amendment in order to ensure its 
power to tax income “from whatever source derived.”  Id. at 303. 
 50 Klein, supra note 23, at 235 (discussing the enactment of the modern income 
tax). 
 51 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67 (1913) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see Klein, supra note 23, at 235 (noting the gift and 
inheritance exclusion from gross income).  Today, the exclusion for gifts and 
inheritances from gross income is found in § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code.  
I.R.C. § 102(a).  The original income tax bill was silent as to gifts but a “Senate 
amendment, accepted without extended debate, provided specifically that the gains 
on, or profit from, but not the value of, property acquired by gifts were to be taxed.”  
Harriss, supra note 25, at 532. 
 52 Klein, supra note 23, at 235. 
 53 Id. (citing 50 CONG. REC. 4422, 4426, 4459-61, 4468-69, 4470 (1913)).  See id. 
for a discussion of the defeated amendment. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 235-36. 
 56 See PAUL, supra note 25, at 106. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. (quoting hearing transcript without citation). 
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tax would create a “well-balanced system of inheritance taxation as 
between the Federal government and the various states,’ and could 
be ‘readily administered with less conflict than a tax based upon the 
shares passing to heirs and distributes or devisees and legatees. . . .”60  
Indeed, the Committee reasoned that the federal government would 
tax “the transfer of the net estate while the states continued to tax the 
shares.”61 
During the congressional debates, public reaction to the estate 
tax bill was intense.62  While some attacked the progessivity of the 
bill,63 calling it socialistic policy, progressives called for higher 
surtaxes.64  Despite the criticisms, Congress passed the bill on 
September 8, 1916, and the modern estate tax was born.65 
Many social and political factors combined to enable Congress 
to enact this estate tax.66  First, the tax was familiar, convenient, and 
practical.67  Many Americans were accustomed to the concept of a 
wealth transfer tax due to its existence in England and early 
American history.68  Additionally, American public sentiment leaned 
heavily towards imposing higher taxes on the wealthy in order to 
 
 60 Id. (quoting hearing transcript without citation). 
 61 Id. at 106-07 (quoting hearing transcript without citation). 
 62 PAUL, supra note 25, at 107-08. 
 63 The New York Times declared the bill an attack on the Northeast and the rich.  
Id. at 107 (citing the New York Times). 
 64 Id.  A “surtax” is “[a]n additional tax imposed on something being taxed or on 
the primary tax itself.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1472 (7th ed. 1999).  See RATNER, 
supra note 30, at 346-52, for a thorough description of the congressional debates 
surrounding the estate tax. 
 65 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  The tax contained a high exemption in order to tax 
only the rich, leaving the states to tax the small estates.  PAUL, supra note 25, at 107.  
The Supreme Court upheld the modern estate tax in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 
U.S. 345 (1921), reasoning that the estate tax was a transfer tax on property, not on 
the ownership of property and, thus was an indirect tax avoiding the apportionment 
clause under the Constitution.  See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1430 (noting the 
constitutional foundation of the estate tax).  The estate tax imposed a tax on the 
transfer of the net estate of the decedent, not on the property.  RATNER, supra note 
30, at 356.  Thus, the 1916 tax was not an inheritance tax.  Id.  Ratner notes: “From 
the standpoint of the heir against that of the community, an inheritance tax on, and 
graded to, the shares of the individual beneficiary was preferable to the estate duty, 
but the difficulties of administration and loss in revenue entailed impelled Congress 
at that time to choose the latter.”  Id. at 357.  The estate tax of 1916 did include gifts 
that were made within the two years prior to death.  Id. 
 66 “The guiding principles behind the federal estate tax were productivity of 
revenue in the face of a fiscal emergency, ease and simplicity of collection, and 
placement of the preparedness tax burden on the wealthy rather than the poor.”  
RATNER, supra note 30, at 357. 
 67 Klein, supra note 23, at 236. 
 68 Id. at 230. 
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break up family fortunes.69  Populist support for an estate tax was 
borne of resentment against big business, the high cost of living, and 
greater public awareness of increases in concentrations of wealth.70  
The writings of “muckrakers”71 also “stirred dissension and class-
consciousness.”72  After its inception, the estate tax underwent minor 
revisions throughout the years,73 but seemed here to stay, at least until 
the 2001 Tax Act.74 
Surprisingly, during the debate surrounding the 1916 Act, no 
one focused on transfers of wealth made by gifts.75  The record is 
devoid of discussion of inter vivos intergenerational transfers.76  That 
discussion occurred eight years later, in order to protect the estate 
tax.77  Not long after the 1916 Act, taxpayers realized that gifting 
schemes could avoid the estate tax.78  This had the added benefit of 
shifting income from the transferred assets to lower-bracket 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 PAUL, supra note 25, at 108.  Two reports (the Manly report and Commons 
report) issued by the Commission of Industrial Relations demonstrated the large 
class differences in the United States in the early twentieth century.  RATNER, supra 
note 30, at 355 (citing the Manly report and Commons report). 
 71 PAUL, supra note 25, at 108. 
 72 Id. 
 73 M.C. Mirow & Bruce A. McGovern, An Obituary of the Federal Estate Tax, 43 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 625, 628-29 (2001). 
 74 See 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1.  Rates were increased or decreased alternatively, 
usually coinciding with wartime, and the scope of property taxed broadened 
throughout the years.  Mirow & McGovern, supra note 73, at 628-29.  As Eisenstein 
summarizes: 
In the quarter-century between 1916 and 1944 the estate tax passed 
through several stages. . . . The first stage ended with the 1921 act.  It 
was a period of rising rates followed by a relapse among the smaller 
estates.  The governing objective was plainly revenue.  The second 
stage was the Mellon era.  It began with the 1924 act and closed with 
the 1932 act.  In that unfortunate period the tax was almost destroyed 
and then revitalized as a source of revenue.  The third stage started 
with the 1934 act and was continued by the 1935 act.  Under these 2 
acts the progression sharpened as the rates climbed from 45 percent to 
70 percent.  The dramatic emphasis was on leveling, but the 
continuing need for revenue in the face of deficits was also effective.  
The fourth stage was marked by the 1940 and 1941 acts.  The larger 
burdens which they imposed derived entirely from the quest for 
revenue. 
Eisenstein, supra note 23, at 830.  Additionally, in 1918, a charitable deduction was 
included.  Mirow & McGovern, supra note 73, at 628.  In 1948, a marital deduction 
was added.  Id. at 629-30. 
 75 See Harriss, supra note 25, at 531-33 (discussing how the treatment of gifts was 
incidental to the treatment of income and estates prior to 1924). 
 76 Klein, supra note 23, at 237. 
 77 RATNER, supra note 30, at 420-21. 
 78 Id. 
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taxpayers.  Congress established the gift tax in 1924 to protect the 
estate tax and income tax from abuse by removing the inter vivos 
exemption.79  Some commentators believe that it was also enacted in 
part as an instrument to equalize wealth.80  In 1926, as a result of a 
“vigorous campaign” led by then-Secretary of the Treasury Andrew 
Mellon, Congress repealed the gift tax and dramatically reduced 
estate tax rates.81  In 1932, however, facing mounting public debt 
caused by the Great Depression, Congress reenacted the gift tax, both 
to help balance the budget and to protect the estate tax.82 
The transfer tax treatment of estates and gifts underwent a 
major overhaul with the 1976 Tax Reform Act, which integrated the 
treatment of estates and gifts into one system that taxed cumulative 
taxable transfers made during life and after death.83  It also 
eliminated many loopholes.84  The unified system combined the fair 
market value of the estate assets with the value of all inter vivos gifts 
(above the annual exclusion amount) executed while the decedent 
was alive.85  Since the unified system totaled all taxable gifts made 
during life with bequests at death, the effect was to give an individual, 
 
 79 Id.; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 313-16 (effective 1924-1926) 
[hereinafter 1924 Gift Tax]. 
 80 RATNER, supra note 30, at 420 (discussing the 1924 Gift Tax); see Eisenstein, 
supra note 23, at 828 (noting that “leveling of hereditary fortunes” became a formal 
objective of the estate tax in the Roosevelt administration). 
 81 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 125 (effective 1926-1932); RATNER, supra 
note 30, at 424-30 (discussing the repeal of the 1924 Gift Tax); see Harriss, supra note 
25, at 538 (stating that only a few members of Congress led the fight against the 
wealth transfer taxes, and several wealthy citizens and large corporations funded the 
fight). 
 82 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 245 (1932) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1932 Gift Tax].  For a discussion of the 
1932 Gift Tax, see RATNER, supra note 30, at 420, and PAUL, supra note 25, at 155-56, 
162.  The 1932 Gift Tax was based on the donor’s cumulative taxable gifts.  RATNER, 
supra note 30, at 420.  Congress reenacted the gift tax to help balance the federal 
budget, prevent avoidance of the estate tax by the wealthy, and decrease “the tax 
burden of the masses.”  Id. at 449-50.  The 1932 Gift Tax differed from the 1924 Gift 
Tax because the 1932 Gift Tax taxed individuals, while the 1924 Gift Tax only taxed 
“gifts made by corporations, trusts, and estates.”  Id. at 450.  Supposedly, Congress 
did not discuss important details and specific features of the 1932 Gift Tax.  Harriss, 
supra note 25, at 538. 
 83 Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 259, 
261-63 (1983). 
 84 Id.  (“[I]n 1976, after nearly thirty years of neglect, Congress adopted a series 
of revisions intended to make the estate and gift taxes apply on a more regular and 
uniform basis.”); Mary R. Wampler, Repealing the Federal Estate Tax: Death to the Death 
Tax, or Will Reform Save the Day?, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 525, 529, 531 (2001) (“In 
1976, the estate and gift taxes were unified into one system in an attempt to reduce 
loopholes and simplify the wealth transfer tax system.”). 
 85 McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1434. 
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and in turn an estate, only one run up the “rate ladder.”86 
The 1976 Tax Reform Act also abolished the fair market value 
basis with respect to inheritances and instead adopted a carryover 
basis.87  As a carryover basis already existed for gifts, Congress 
intended to remove the income tax bias against lifetime transfers 
created by the fair market value basis for inheritances.88  Congress 
later repealed this carryover basis provision and readopted the prior 
rule of a stepped up basis to fair market value at death.89 
The 1976 Tax Reform Act also added a generation-skipping tax 
to the transfer tax system.90  A generation-skipping tax became 
necessary in order to prevent wealthy taxpayers from eliminating an 
entire layer, sometimes two layers, of transfer tax by simply skipping a 
generation when transferring wealth.91  After the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, the wealth transfer system remained relatively unchanged, until 
 
 86 Id.  Taxpayers were forced to make only one run up the “rate ladder” because 
all taxable gifts and, finally, the estate were added together and taxed at progressively 
higher rates.  Id. 
 87 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1874 (1976) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  A “carryover basis” is “the basis of 
property transferred by gift or in trust, equaling the transferor’s basis.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 145 (7th ed. 1999). 
 88 Schlachter, supra note 15, at 783. 
 89 Id.  Many commentators have criticized the carryover basis.  See, e.g., Joseph 
Dodge, What’s Wrong With Carryover Basis Under H.R. 8, 91 TAX NOTES 961, 971-72 
(2001) (stating that a carryover basis would “violate the principle that income should 
be attributed to the person who earned it” and that “tax avoidance through gain 
shifting would still be a problem for estate-transferred property, which could be 
allocated among legatees following death so as to lower aggregate income tax 
burdens”); Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax Bill—News Analysis—Debt in Contemplation of 
Death, 91 TAX NOTES 1655, 1659-60 (2001) (“Carryover basis presents a host of 
administrative problems . . . .”).  See generally Stepping Up to the Repeal of the Estate Tax: 
New Ways are being Looked at to Value Gains When You Die, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 
2001, at 25 (discussing the carryover basis).  Interestingly, the 2001 Tax Act applies 
the carryover basis.  2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, § 542. 
 90 Graetz, supra note 83, at 261.  The tax was simplified in 1986 to tax “skip 
persons.”  Glendall Jones Jr., Repeal the Estate Tax? Bad Move: The Transfer Tax System 
Paradigm, 89 TAX NOTES 793, 794 (2000). “Skip persons” include “heirs two or more 
generations below the transferor . . . [or] a trust, where the trust operates exclusively 
for the benefit of grandchildren or a younger generation.”  Id. (stating that the aim 
of the generation-skipping tax is to tax intergenerational wealth transfers through 
trusts, thus taxing “assets held by a trust as they pass” through generations). 
 91 Id.  The House of Representatives describes the generation-skipping tax: 
A generation-skipping transfer tax generally is imposed on transfers, 
either directly or indirectly or through a trust or similar arrangement, 
to a ‘skip person’ (i.e., a beneficiary in a generation more than one 
generation below that of the transferor).  Transfers subject to the 
generation-skipping transfer tax include direct skips, taxable 
terminations, and taxable distributions. 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 180 (2001). 
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the enactment of the 2001 Tax Act.92 
II. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 
The debate regarding the desirability of estate and gift taxes 
(“EGT”) has raged for over eighty-five years.93  During that time, the 
policy justifications both in favor and against such taxes have 
remained the same.94  With the 2001 Tax Act, the estate tax 
opponents triumphed, albeit temporarily.95  Yet, considering the 
possibility that estate tax repeal may become permanent,96 the policy 
arguments should be reexamined in order to ascertain whether other 
modifications to the tax treatment of gifts and inheritances would be 
required.  Specifically, should either the gift tax or the exclusion 
under § 102, or both, be retained in an estate tax-free world? 
A. Arguments for the Retention of Estate and Gift Taxes 
1. Revenue 
The most important historical justification for the EGT is the 
justification for all taxes: revenue.  The EGT generates $20 to $30 
billion per year, approximately 1.4-percent of the federal 
government’s total revenue.97  Only two-percent of estates incur estate 
 
 92 See 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1. 
 93 Schmalbeck, supra note 16, at 749; see supra Part I (discussing the enactment of 
the modern wealth transfer system). 
 94 See generally William G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, A Matter of Life and Death: 
Reassessing the Estate and Gift Tax, 88 TAX NOTES 927 (2000) (arguing for reform of 
the estate and gift taxes (“EGT”)); Christopher E. Erblich, To Bury Federal Transfer 
Taxes Without Further Adieu, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1931 (1994) (arguing for repeal of 
the EGT). 
 95 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521.  Nevertheless, this repeal is only 
temporary as the tax system is to return to its pre-2001 Tax Act status in 2011.  Id.  § 
901.  In other words, without further legislation the 2001 Tax Act does not apply 
after December 31, 2010.  Campbell, supra note 8, at 623. 
 96 See supra note 16 for a discussion of congressional bills calling for the 
permanent repeal of the estate tax. 
 97 Joint Econ. Comm., The Economics of the Estate Tax, at 
http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/estattax/estattax.htm (Dec. 1998) (on 
file with author).  Literature differs on the exact impact of the EGT on federal 
revenues.  One source states that from 1990 to 1998, the estate tax averaged $15.3 
billion, about one-percent of federal revenues.  Schlachter, supra note 15, at 789.  
The Congressional Budget Office projected that the estate tax would raise $30 billion 
in 2000, $37 billion in 2005, and $48 billion in 2010 (based on the estate tax system 
as existed in 2000).  Richard L. Heaton, The Death of the Death Tax?, 42 ORANGE 
COUNTY LAW. 6 (Nov. 2000).  Another source forecasted $331 billion in revenues 
from 1999-2008.  James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 
1493, 1495, 1497 (2000) (recommending that Congress retain the EGT).  Most 
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tax liability.98  Considering the EGT’s small contribution to 
government revenues, and that the federal government sustains 
trillions of dollars in outlays a year, the revenue generated by the 
EGT appears negligible.99  And yet, many argue that $25 billion is still 
a substantial amount.100 
The revenue loss, however, is not just that of the federal 
government.  States will feel part of the brunt of EGT repeal due to 
the State Death Tax Credit (the so-called “soak up” provision), which 
includes a federal estate tax credit for any estate tax paid to a state.101  
In 2001, the total revenue generated by the fifty states through the 
soak up provision was approximately $5 billion.102  When the EGT is 
 
scholars agree that the EGT contributes about one to two-percent of all federal 
revenues.  McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1433.  See Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis—
Goodbye Estate Tax?, 90 TAX NOTES 423 (2001), for a detailed summary of estate tax 
returns.  Supporters note that revenue from the EGT doubled between 1993 and 
1998.  See also Charles Davenport & Jay Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 
TAX NOTES 591, 625 (1999) (discussing the costs of the EGT and finding the estate 
tax efficient). 
 98 William G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, The Estate Tax Plays a Key Role, AARP BULL. 
(Apr. 2001), available at http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gale/200104.htm (on 
file with author); see Leonard E. Burman & William G. Gale, The Estate Tax is Down, 
But Not Out, 94 TAX NOTES 1039 (2002) (discussing the small percentage of taxpayers 
that actually incur estate tax liability). 
 99 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 (stating the costs 
of government programs), at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-
02.html (2002) (on file with author).  The United States spends approximately $2 
trillion a year in outlays.  Id. at 305.  The Joint Committee on Taxation predicts that 
permanent repeal of the estate would result in the loss of $56 billion in revenue in 
2012.  Friedman, supra note 16, at 1984.  Furthermore, permanent repeal of the 
estate tax would result in the loss of approximately $740 billion in revenues from 
2013 through 2022.  Id. 
 100 Repetti, supra note 97, at 1495-97.  See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying 
text for the counterarguments set forth by the opponents of the EGT. 
 101 I.R.C. § 2011 (2003).  The House of Representatives describes the State Death 
Tax Credit: 
A credit is allowed against the Federal estate tax for any estate, 
inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State or the 
District of Columbia with respect to any property included in the 
decedent’s gross estate.  The maximum amount of credit allowable for 
State death taxes is determined under a graduated rate table. . . . Most 
States impose a “pick-up” or “soak-up” estate tax, which serves to 
impose a State tax equal to the maximum Federal credit allowed. 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 180 (2001).  Thus, the taxpayer is not burdened by a state 
estate tax, rather the system simply shifts revenue from the federal government to the 
state.  Schlachter, supra note 15, at 799-801; Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. 
Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 90 TAX NOTES 
393, 397 (2001) (“[T]he biggest losers of all of the elimination of the federal wealth 
transfer tax system will be the several states.”). 
 102 Iris J. Lav & Joel Friedman, Estate Tax Repeal: A Costly Windfall for the Wealthiest 
Americans (including a chart of each state’s revenue received from the federal estate 
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repealed, this source of revenue for states will be lost.103  To replace 
this revenue, states would need to increase the amount of revenue 
they currently derive from inheritance taxes.  But, since thirty-six 
states have repealed or modified their inheritance taxes, some 
commentators fear a “race to the bottom.”104 
2. Progressivity 
Recognizing the limited revenue generated by the tax,105 some 
supporters of the EGT emphasize instead the progressive106 nature of 
the tax.107  These scholars claim that the EGT plays a pivotal role in 
maintaining a progressive tax system.108  By falling on the wealthiest 
one to two-percent of the public, the EGT provides approximately 
one-third of the tax system’s progressivity, somewhat surprising given 
that the EGT only contributes about 1.4 percent of the federal 
revenue.109  Opponents insist that an income tax could provide 
sufficient progressivity to the American tax system if Congress were to 
adjust rates and brackets accordingly.110  Moreover, they argue that 
 
tax credit), at http://www.cbpp.org/5-25-00tax.htm 12-13 (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with 
author). 
 103 States collect approximately one-quarter of the revenue raised by the estate 
tax.  Wampler, supra note 84, at 538. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities 
estimates that the states would lose approximately $16 billion from 2003 to 2007 due 
to the 2001 Tax Act.  Marilyn Geewax, Plan to Eliminate Estate Tax Attracts Unlikely 
Opposition, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2003, at 6. 
 104 It is unlikely that states will act quickly to increase inheritance taxes.  
Schlachter, supra note 15, at 800 (arguing that states have engaged in a race to the 
bottom).  See Oskar R. Harmon, The Estate Tax: Repeal or Reform?, 91 TAX NOTES 2072 
(2001), for a discussion of the effect of estate tax repeal on the states. 
 105 See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited 
revenue raised by the EGT. 
 106 Progressivity involves the wealthy paying a higher percentage of taxes than the 
poor, justified by notions of fairness, ability to pay, and preventing large 
accumulations of wealth.  Schlachter, supra note 15, at 806. Associated with 
progressivity, supporters claim the EGT is essential to vertical equity, which involves 
taxing the wealthy more than lower income individuals.  Jones, supra note 90, at 794. 
 107 Graetz, supra note 83, at 269-72; see Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive 
Estate and Gift Tax, 15 AKRON TAX J. 35 (2000) (including a brief description of the 
historical and judicial treatment of progressive taxation). 
 108 Graetz, supra note 83, at 272. 
 109 Id.; Schlachter, supra note 15, at 808.  “About 96 percent of those who die in a 
given year do not have to file estate tax returns, and half of those who file owe no 
taxes once credits and deductions are claimed.”  Burman & Gale, supra note 98, at 
1041.  Furthermore, “only about 2 percent of deaths result in estate tax liability, and 
payments are highly concentrated within that group.”  Id.  In Dickman v. United States, 
465 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1984), the United States Supreme Court upheld the gift tax 
due to the progressive nature of the tax. 
 110 Some scholars argue that the repeal of the estate tax and adoption of a 
carryover basis regime “can be structured to include a substantial element of 
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the progressivity of the EGT is more psychological than real and that 
studies demonstrate that the wealthiest taxpayers often pay lower 
effective rates than taxpayers in lower brackets because of 
sophisticated tax planning techniques.111  Conversely, supporters 
claim Congress should reform the current EGT system to eliminate 
loopholes, thus enabling the tax to provide an efficient mechanism to 
add progressivity to the American tax structure.112 
3. Social Policy 
Another popular argument in favor of the EGT is that it 
promotes a social policy of decentralizing and redistributing wealth.113  
Scholars have long argued that large concentrations of wealth 
endanger democratic society and conflict with the American ideal of 
equal opportunity.114  The EGT is necessary to combat these 
inequities.115 
 
progressivity.”  See, e.g., Schlachter, supra note 15, at 788. 
 111 Id. at 809. 
 112 Id. at 788. 
 113 Repetti, supra note 97, at 1498 (finding that the estate tax does help reduce 
dynastic wealth). 
 114 See Dennis Kessler & André Masson, On Five Hot Issues on Wealth Distribution, 32 
EUR. ECON. REV. 644, 646-47 (1988) (discussing the debate regarding the importance 
of inheritance on wealth accumulation and inequality); Alan S. Blinder, Distribution 
Effects and the Aggregate Consumption Function, 83 J. POL. ECON. 447 (1975) (finding 
that even if the distribution of income is equalized, aggregate consumption would 
remain the same or diminish only slightly); see also John G. Steinkamp, Case for Federal 
Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1, 82-84 (2002) (arguing in favor of the EGT 
because it helps reduce concentrations of wealth).  Andrew Carnegie believed that 
large inheritances conflicted with the democratic ideal of equal opportunity.  
ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 10 (1933).  Recently, “[a] group of 120 
wealthy Americans—including investors George Soros and Warren E. Buffet and Bill 
Gates’ father—have signed a petition urging Congress to keep the estate tax . . . .”  
William Neikirk, Estate-Tax Issue Sparks Wealth of Arguments, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2001, at 
1.  For a discussion of social policy associated with the estate tax, see Geewax, supra 
note 103, at 6, and Dean Calbreath, Death & Taxes; Not All Wealthy Americans Are In 
Favor Of Eliminating Inheritance Taxes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 15, 2002, at C1. 
 115 Repetti, supra note 97, at 1498.  Some scholars believe the real concern is 
whether the EGT affects wealth concentrations, rather than income concentrations, 
because wealth concentrations impact the political process by investments and 
consumption.  Id. 149 of the 400 wealthiest individuals in the United States in 1999 
began with inherited fortunes.  Id.  This number was even greater in 1984.  Id.  Other 
scholars believe concentrations of wealth still exist due to avoidance of the EGT by 
taxpayers.  Jones, supra note 90, at 796; see Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All 
Transfer Taxes, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215, 1218-19 (1984) (stating that the estate tax 
does not break up concentrations of wealth because of tax avoidance).  For an 
extreme view of how to equalize wealth, see Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited 
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990).  Professor Ascher suggests that wealth transfer 
taxes should be used to curtail inheritances by selling property owned at death and 
giving the proceeds to the government, with certain exceptions.  Id. 
  
2004 COMMENT 687 
Although the estate tax is strongly supported as a tool to break 
up concentrations of wealth, statistics demonstrate that little has 
changed in the years since Congress enacted the EGT.116  The Joint 
Economic Committee, a group consisting of both members from the 
House of Representatives and Senate, has found that the EGT has 
little impact on the distribution of wealth, mainly because of 
intangible advantages of high-income households.117  Commentators 
argue that the inequality still existing in the United States 
demonstrates that “wealth is simply taken from one class and is never 
seen by the other” as concentrations of wealth continue to grow and 
redistribution programs are inefficient.118  As the empirical studies 
reveal, the EGT has little effect on wealth concentration.119 
4. Charitable Giving 
In addition to revenue, progressivity, and social policy, a further 
justification of the EGT is that it promotes charitable giving.120  The 
 
 116 A study showed the richest one-percent of the population had one-fourth to 
one-fifth of the total wealth over the last fifty years.  Graetz, supra note 83, at 271.  
Even more so, the inequality of wealth may have increased since the 1970s, perhaps 
because only a small part of wealth is attributed to inheritances.  Schlachter, supra 
note 15, at 792. 
 117 Joint Econ. Comm., supra note 97, at 3 (stating that “the estate tax fails on 
liberal, progressive grounds because it discourages work and saving in favor of large-
scale consumption . . . there is no empirical evidence to support the view that the 
estate tax is effective at reducing inequality . . . much of the research which suggests 
that the estate tax is a poor tool to address inequality has been done by economists 
who themselves are generally sympathetic to issues of income inequality”).  
Advantages of high income households include “human wealth,” which is “derived 
from favorable educational and environmental opportunities, as well as 
‘connections’ due to family background and marriage.”  Jacob Mikow & Darien 
Berkowitz, Beyond Andrew Carnegie: Using a Linked Sample of Federal Income and Estate 
Tax Returns to Examine the Effects of Bequests on Beneficiary Behavior, at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=106176,00.html (Oct. 2000) (on file with 
author). 
 118 Jones, supra note 90, at 794; see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, 
Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S137 
(1978) (stating that the estate tax may actually increase inequality of income and 
wealth due to capital accumulation effects). 
 119 Erblich, supra note 94, at 1936-37; see Joint Econ. Comm., supra note 97, at 5 
(stating that inheritance is “not a major source of inequality” or that “government 
policies aimed at inheritance are likely to be ineffective” for three reasons: first, 
“there is only a weak correlation between wealth and income;” second, “efforts to 
curtail wealth transfers will induce wealth holders to increase their consumption;” 
and third, “the high degree of wealth and income mobility in the economy means 
that government efforts to redistribute wealth will necessarily meet with limited 
success”). 
 120 Charities receive around $150 billion in gifts annually and the repeal of the 
estate and gift taxes may cause a reduction of $15 to $20 billion.  Schlachter, supra 
note 15, at 801. 
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EGT encourages charitable contributions by excluding bequests to 
charities from the decedent’s estate.121  Thus, many charitable 
organizations lobbied against repeal of the EGT, arguing that repeal 
would reduce charitable giving.122 
Opponents of the EGT, however, argue that it is “costly, 
cumbersome, and [an] indirect way to assist charities.”123  Studies 
demonstrate that tax deductions have only “nominal effects” on 
charitable gifts; tax incentives, of course, are not the only motivating 
factors of charitable contributions.124  Furthermore, the repeal of the 
estate tax may just shift bequests at death to gifts during life.125 
B. Arguments for the Repeal of Estate and Gift Taxes 
Opponents of the EGT have disputed each of the justifications—
revenue, progressivity, social policy, and charitable giving—discussed 
above.126  In addition, they have advanced quite different policy 
arguments to justify repeal of the EGT.127 
1. Revenue 
Opponents of the EGT contend that it is a relatively paltry 
source of revenue for the federal government.128  After factoring in 
the costs of administration, including employing tax lawyers to 
combat tax avoidance, retaining large numbers of IRS agents, and 
maintaining government administration, opponents maintain that 
the EGT raises little revenue.129  In contrast to the revenue raised 
 
 121 I.R.C. § 2055 (2003).  See David Abel, Estate Tax End May Hit Charity, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2001, at A15, for a discussion of the impact of estate tax repeal on 
charitable contributions. 
 122 David R. Francis, Charities Harden Opposition To An Estate-Tax Repeal, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 25, 2002, at 17. 
 123 McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1435. 
 124 See Joint Econ. Comm., supra note 97, at 10 (stating that “charitable tax 
deduction exerts only a modest, if any, stimulative effect” and “although the 
charitable deduction affects the timing of donations, it may not significantly alter the 
overall level of giving”). 
 125 Schlachter, supra note 15, at 801-02. 
 126 For a summary of arguments for and against the EGT, see Edward J. McCaffery 
et al., Should We End Life Support for Death Taxes?, 88 TAX NOTES 1373 (2000), and 
Edward J. McCaffery & Richard E. Wagner, A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence 
from Death Taxation, 88 TAX NOTES 801 (2000). 
 127 See supra note 126. 
 128 Repeal of the estate tax may actually boost gross domestic product to such an 
extent that within ten years, federal tax revenue would be higher than if the estate 
tax was maintained.  Stephen J. Entin, Why the Death Tax Lives, WALL ST. J., June 19, 
2002, at A18. 
 129 Bruce Bartlett, The End of the Estate Tax?, 76 TAX NOTES 105, 109 (1997); 
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from the corporate tax, excise tax, and employment taxes, the 
contribution of the EGT is insignificant.130  In 2000, the corporate 
taxes raised $236 billion, comprising 11.2-percent of total revenue.131  
Employment taxes raised $640 billion that year, or 30.5-percent of 
total revenue.132  The EGT, by comparison, brought in approximately 
$30 billion, only 1.4-percent of total revenue.133  Furthermore, the 
federal government collected more revenue from excise taxes than it 
did from the EGT: in 2000, the excise tax raised $55 billion, 2.6-
percent of total revenue collected.134  As these figures demonstrate, 
the EGT provides relatively little revenue for the federal government. 
2. Double Taxation 
One frequent argument against the EGT is that it results in 
double taxation.135  Opponents assert that accumulations of wealth 
are first taxed under the income tax system and then again at 
death.136  Although that may be true of wage income that becomes 
savings, a significant portion of a taxpayer’s wealth at death consists 
of untaxed, unrealized appreciation in assets.137  Furthermore, since 
the basis of assets transferred at death are stepped up to fair market 
value, these gains will never be taxed if all transfer taxes are 
 
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 
300-02 (1994) (discussing the high costs associated with the EGT); John E. 
Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or 
Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 564 (1993) (stating that even with 
improvements of the transfer tax system, costs of the system are still unacceptable).  
Opponents argue revenue is low due to the narrow tax base.  See Charles O. Galvin, 
To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413, 1414 (1991) (“The target 
population to which the wealth transfer system applies is only a miniscule percentage 
of the total population, and there is little probability of broadening that base.”). 
 130 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 99, at 314. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Heaton, supra note 97, at 6.  As Entin describes double taxation: 
Income is taxed when earned.  If used for consumption, there is 
generally no further federal tax, except for a few excise taxes.  If saved, 
the returns are taxed as interest, dividends and capital gains, and, if put 
into corporate shares, there is the corporate income tax too.  Even if 
the saving was in a tax-deferred retirement account, it will be subject to 
the heirs’ income tax in the years following inheritance.  Consequently, 
every penny in an estate has either been subject to income taxes, often 
more than once, or is about to be subject to income taxes.  The death 
tax is always an extra layer of punishment. 
Entin, supra note 128, at A18. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Vasek, supra note 21, at 961-62. 
  
690 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:671 
repealed.138  In addition, double taxation exists throughout the tax 
system; for example, sales tax imposed on consumed earnings that 
have already been subjected to an income tax.139 
3. Effect on Behavior 
One of the tenets of a good tax system is that, to the extent 
possible, it should minimize negative effects on behavior and 
economic activity.140  The EGT may distort economic decisions by 
intruding on a parent’s interest in providing for future generations.141  
Additionally, it is argued, the EGT may decrease capital stocks, 
reduce long-run growth, and encourage leisure, consumption, and 
lavish spending.142  Indeed, opponents contend that the EGT deters 
labor and “intergenerational savings.”143 
There is conflicting empirical data regarding the actual effect 
the EGT has on saving behavior.144  Because of the inability to isolate 
the EGT as a single factor due to other “intangible transfers,” it is 
difficult to determine whether gifts and inheritances affect work 
ethic.145  In addition, studies differ as to whether gifts and 
 
 138 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 394.  The stepped up basis existed in the 
EGT system before the 2001 Tax Act.  See I.R.C. § 1014. 
 139 See Louis Lyons, GOP LawMakers Unveil National Retail Sales Tax Plan, 70 TAX 
NOTES 1432, 1432 (1996) (stating that proponents of a national retail sales tax argue 
that the sales tax “would eliminate double taxation on savings and investment 
income, reduce hidden taxes passed on to consumers by corporations, increase 
economic growth, and reduce the cost of consumer goods”). 
 140 WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11 (13th ed. 2003).  “The 
principle of neutrality holds that the choice of a tax structure should not affect 
taxpayer behavior by favoring one form of wealth transmission over another.”  
Schlachter, supra note 15, at 793-94. 
 141 Jones, supra note 90, at 794-95.  Some scholars believe that “to the extent that 
the estate tax reduces a parent’s ability to leave an estate to his children, it will have a 
negative effect on his willingness to accumulate wealth through work, saving, and 
investing.”  Bartlett, supra note 129, at 107.  The EGT basically “distort[s] behavior 
and investment decisions” of people who want to leave wealth to heirs.  McCaffery, 
supra note 2, at 1435. 
 142 See Edward J. McCaffery, Rethinking the Estate Tax, 67 TAX NOTES 1678, 1680 
(1995) (“The estate tax discourages behavior that a liberal, democratic society ought 
to like—work, savings, bequests—and encourages behavior that such a society ought 
to suspect—the large-scale consumption, leisure, and inter vivos giving of the very 
rich.”). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Repetti, supra note 97, at 1498.  Some believe the estate tax falls on the wrong 
people; instead of taxing savers, it should tax spenders.  McCaffery, supra note 2, at 
1435.  Yet, other scholars remark that it is not always beneficial to save.  Jones, supra 
note 90, at 794-95.  “The death tax also reduces revenues by weakening incentive to 
save and invest.  Less investment means lower productivity and lower taxable wages, 
profits, interest, dividends and capital gains.”  Entin, supra note 128, at A18. 
 145 Mikow & Berkowitz, supra note 117, at 1 (stating that one type of “intangible 
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inheritances actually decrease the labor force.146 
4. Simplification and Fairness 
Opponents of the EGT argue that its repeal will result in 
simplification and fairness.147  The simplification argument is 
somewhat obvious; if no tax exists, it is certainly simpler than if a tax 
does exist.148  Since only two-percent of Americans die with enough 
wealth to trigger the estate tax and because the EGT has the highest 
rate of taxation, people go to great lengths to avoid paying the tax.149 
The fairness concern is more complex.  The tremendous lengths 
taxpayers go to avoid the EGT may impair horizontal equity because 
the schemes developed form inequities in the tax system, preventing 
similarly situated individuals from being taxed alike.150  Furthermore, 
the estate tax may violate vertical equity if the wealthy eliminate or 
defer taxes through estate planning, hindering the ability of the 
government to tax their wealth.151  One scholar even remarked, 
 
transfer” is “human wealth,” which is “derived from favorable educational and 
environmental opportunities, as well as ‘connections’ due to family background and 
marriage”). 
 146 For an overview of the EGT’s potential impact on behavior, see William G. 
Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, Rethinking the Estate and Gift Tax, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/conferencereport/cr05.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2003) (on file with author).  Compare Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., The Carnegie 
Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence, 108 Q. J. ECON. 413 (1993) (finding that heirs 
work less after receiving an inheritance), and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Death Tax: 
Investments, Employment, and Entrepreneurs, 84 TAX NOTES 782 (1999) (finding that the 
EGT may discourage older taxpayers from working), with David Joulfaian & Mark D. 
Wilhelm, Inheritance and Labor Supply, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1205, 1207 (1994) 
(finding that although inheritances increased consumption by heirs, the effect was 
insignificant). 
 147 Erblich, supra note 94, at 1943-44, 1951-53, 1967-68. 
 148 Id. at 1951-52 (“It is universally agreed that the federal transfer tax system is 
too complex.”). 
 149 McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1430, 1433.  Some scholars believe that the EGT 
decreases income tax revenues because it encourages transfers to low income 
donees.  See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 113, 135 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1987).  Some scholars 
disagree with this theory.  See, e.g., Repetti, supra note 97, at 1497. 
 150 Jones, supra note 90, at 794; see Erblich, supra note 94, at 1943 (“Horizontal 
equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed alike.  Thus, 
horizontal equity dictates that the transfer tax system taxes two individuals who have 
identical amounts of wealth and who make identical transfers the same.  The federal 
transfer tax system does not meet this goal.”).  “Among donors with the same wealth, 
the taxes discriminate on the basis of how resources are spent, violating the notion 
that those with equal means should pay equal taxes.”  Gale & Slemrod, supra note 
146, at 3. 
 151 Id. 
The principle of vertical equity states that people with a greater ability 
  
692 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:671 
“during periods when estate tax rates were rising, revenue from the 
estate tax fell.  Conversely, lower estate tax rates increased estate tax 
revenue, because it was no longer as profitable to engage in costly 
estate planning.”152 
A different fairness question arises with concerns about 
liquidity.153 Opponents argue that many estates are forced to sell 
assets in order to pay the tax.154  This argument may be more 
rhetorical than factual given the provisions allowing taxpayers, in 
certain circumstances, to extend payment of the tax for up to 16 
years.155 
5. Morality 
Opponents of the EGT maintain that the EGT imposes 
numerous moral concerns.156  They argue that it is immoral and 
irrational to tax the dead and burden the beneficiaries when they are 
grieving.157  While the EGT taxes the estate, opponents of the EGT 
 
to pay taxes should pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes.  
Thus, vertical equity dictates that people who transfer a greater amount 
of wealth should pay a higher proportion of their wealth in taxes.  The 
federal transfer tax system does not meet this fairness goal.  Instead, 
people who have greater amounts of wealth to transfer simply have a 
greater incentive to visit an estate planner to avoid the transfer taxes. 
Erblich, supra note 94, at 1944.  Scholars have called the estate taxes mere “penalties” 
to those with poor estate planning, rather than taxes.  Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. 
Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer Taxes, 45 NAT’L TAX J., 119, 138 
(1992).  Some argue that a “disproportionate burden of the estate tax often falls on 
those with recently acquired, modest wealth: farmers, small businessmen and the 
like” because they are less familiar with estate planning.  Bartlett, supra note 129, at 
106. 
 152 Id. 
 153 “Liquidity” is “the quality or state of being readily convertible to cash.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 942 (7th ed. 1999). 
 154 Repetti, supra note 97, at 1509.  Opponents also claim that small businesses 
and farms do not pass from one generation to the next due to the high EGT.  
Bartlett, supra note 129, at 107.  Furthermore, opponents allege that in order to 
finance the high tax liability, many farms and businesses need to merge or sell out.  
Id.  Supporters of the EGT counter by arguing that the opponents use small business 
owners and farmers as “shills” because only a small percentage of farmers are actually 
taxed.  Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Straight Talk About the ‘Death’ Tax: Politics, Economics, and 
Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159, 1162 (2000). 
 155 I.R.C. § 6166 (2003). 
 156 See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1443 (stating that the biggest problem with the 
EGT is a moral one). 
 157 Gale & Slemrod, supra note 94, at 929 (“Opponents often view death as an 
illogical time to impose taxes at best, and a morally repugnant one at worst.  
Compounding the grief of a family with a tax, of all things, seems a bit heartless, and 
the mention of ‘death tax’ evokes queasiness.”); Entin, supra note 128, at A18 (“The 
death tax is punitive and immoral, because it is an extra tax on hard work and 
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argue that the beneficiaries, in reality, are paying the tax since the 
assets already have passed to the beneficiaries by the time Congress 
collects the estate tax.158  Additionally, some argue that the EGT is at 
odds with what makes us distinctly American, the idea that anything is 
possible through hard work and savings.159  Furthermore, opponents 
contend that the EGT penalizes those who acquire wealth, taxing 
savers instead of spenders.160 
Surveys also reveal that Americans dislike the EGT.161  The low 
opinion may be due to the “lottery effect,” that is, the hope of dying 
wealthy.162  This low popularity, however, may be misleading because 
studies demonstrate that “most Americans do not understand the 
estate tax and underlying policies.”163 
III. 2001 TAX ACT 
While previous attempts to repeal the estate tax failed, repeal 
proponents finally prevailed with the implementation of the 2001 
Tax Act.164  The election of President George W. Bush and the 
prospect of huge budget surpluses created a political climate that 
enabled Congress to pass the 2001 Tax Act, with its dramatic 
 
thrift.”). 
 158 Edward J. Gac & Sharon K. Brougham, A Proposal for Restructuring the Taxation 
of Wealth Transfers: Tax Reform Redux?, 5 AKRON TAX J. 75, 89 (1988). 
 159 Jones, supra note 90, at 794-95; Donaldson, supra note 129, at 551. 
 160 McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1434. 
 161 Id. at 1440; see McCaffery, supra note 129, at 364-65 (“The people’s opposition 
and seventy-five years of increasingly settled practices have shown that democratic 
society does not want any meaningful wealth transfer tax.”). 
 162 Id.  For a discussion of the public reaction to the EGT, see Schlachter, supra 
note 15, at 810, and Jones, supra note 90, at 795. 
 163 Jones, supra note 90, at 795. “[U]sing popularity as a basis for determining the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of any tax creates a skewed result given the 
predisposition of many Americans to oppose the payment of taxes.”  Id. 
 164 President Clinton vetoed two attempts to repeal the EGT.  See Joint Comm. on 
Tax’n, JCT Provides Overview of Bush’s Individual Income Tax Proposals, 2001 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 55-5 (2001) (including a description of President Bush’s income tax 
proposals).  See also Jones, supra note 90, at 794 (discussing recent attempts to repeal 
the estate tax).  The Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 called for the gradual 
repeal of the estate and gift taxes beginning in 2001 and ending in 2009 with a 
complete repeal.  Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong.   
§ 601 (1999).  The Death Tax Elimination Act also involved a gradual elimination of 
the wealth transfer system over a ten-year period.  Death Tax Elimination Act of 
2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 101 (2000).  The Act called for a repeal of the 55-percent 
rates in 2001.  Id. §§ 201, 301.  In 2002, the unified tax credit would have turned into 
an exemption and a new 50-percent rate would have replaced the 53-percent rate.  
Id.  The rates would have continued to reduce by one to two percent each year until 
2010 when the rates would reduce to zero.  Id. 
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changes.165  No doubt, Congress’s efforts were aided by a successful 
rhetorical campaign that changed the public debate from a 
discussion of “estate” taxes to anger about “death” taxes.166 
The 2001 Tax Act provides for a sweeping reduction of overall 
tax liability in the total amount of $1.35 trillion dollars.167  The vast 
bulk of the revenue reduction resulted from income tax rate 
reduction.168  Measured in dollar terms, the 2001 Act’s estate tax 
provisions pale in comparison to the income tax.169  In terms of tax 
policy, however, the effort to repeal the estate tax is perhaps the most 
significant change brought about by the 2001 Tax Act. 
Although the 2001 Tax Act provides for a one-year repeal of the 
estate tax and generation-skipping tax in 2010, it does not repeal the 
gift tax.170  The Act calls for a gradual reduction of estate, generation-
skipping, and gift tax rates starting in 2002.171  Between 2002 and 
2007, the tax rates are reduced by one-percent each year, beginning 
with the repeal of the 50-percent tax rate in 2002.172  Also in 2002, the 
five-percent surtax was repealed and the unified credit exemption 
was increased to $1 million.173  In 2004, the unified credit exemption 
for estates increases to $1.5 million, but the unified credit exemption 
 
 165 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the political landscape 
surrounding the enactment of the 2001 Tax Act).  “In January 2001, when President 
Bush took office and the debate [the 2001 Tax Act] began, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) projected a ten-year surplus of $5.6 trillion . . . .”  William G. 
Gale & Samara R. Potter, The Bush Tax Cut: One Year Later, at 
http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb101.htm (June 2002) (on file with 
author); see also Citizens for Tax Justice, Year-by-year Analysis of the Bush Tax Cut Shows 
Growing Tilt to the Very Rich 4 (arguing that in order to “squeeze Bush’s $2.5 trillion 
ten-year tax cut into a $1.3 trillion budget target” Congress strategically made the 
most expensive provisions arrive on different dates), at 
http://www.ctj.org/html/gwb0602.htm (June 12, 2002) (on file with author); Fiscal 
Balance and the President’s Tax Proposal: Hearings Before the Senate Budget Committee, 
108th Cong. (2001) (statement of Gene Sperling), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~budget/republican/about/hearing2001/sperling.htm (on 
file with author). 
 166 Neikirk, supra note 114, at 1; see Ventry, supra note 154, at 1163 (“Even the 
term critics use to describe all forms of transfer taxes—‘death’ taxes—is seriously 
misleading.”). 
 167 Kessler & Eilperin, supra note 9, at A01. 
 168 See Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-
2012, ch. 3, at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3277&sequence=4 (Jan. 
2002) (on file with author). 
 169 Id. 
 170 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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for gifts remains at $1 million.174  In 2006, the unified credit 
exemption for estates increases to $2 million, and in 2009 it increases 
to $3.5 million; the gift tax exemption, however, remains at $1 
million.175  Then, in 2010, the 2001 Tax Act provides for the one-year 
repeal of the estate and generation-skipping taxes.176  In 2011, the 
EGT returns to its pre-2001 Tax Act form.177 
As stated above, the 2001 Tax Act retained the gift tax.178  By 
2010, a $1 million dollar lifetime gift exclusion will apply and the gift 
tax rates will equal the highest individual income tax rates.179  
Congress retained the gift tax to prevent taxpayers from gifting large 
amounts of wealth during the 2010 window, resulting in no estate left 
to tax in 2011 when the estate tax returns.180  Additionally, Congress 
maintained the gift tax to prevent income tax avoidance.181  
Specifically, the rich could transfer wealth to lower-bracketed 
individuals and individuals with unused capital losses.182  
Furthermore, the rich could transfer wealth to foreigners since non-
U.S. citizens have lower maximum income tax rates than the 
wealthiest Americans, and foreigners pay only capital gains tax on 
real-estate.183  Wealthy families could even encourage the poorest 
family member to expatriate.184  The recipient would then sell the 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521. 
 177 Id. § 901. 
 178 Id. §§ 511, 521. 
 179 Id.; Sheppard, supra note 89, at 1655. 
 180 Lav & Friedman, supra note 102, at 8-9.  If Congress repealed the gift tax, 
“government losses will be some $100 billion annually after 2012, half of that amount 
in tax evasion.”  Goldsborough, supra note 9, at B13. 
 181 Charles D. Fox & Svetlana V. Bekman, Gift Tax Repeal: Responding to Opponents’ 
Concerns, 92 TAX NOTES 1733 (2001).  “[T]he Joint Tax Committee estimated that 
repeal of both the estate and gift tax would result in a revenue loss of $97 billion in 
2011, of which $44 billion reflected a reduction in income tax revenues due to 
income tax evasion.”  Friedman, supra note 16, at 1986; see Martin A. Sullivan, 
Economic Analysis—JCT Estimates Widespread Evasion with Estate Tax Repeal, 91 TAX 
NOTES 10 (2001) (discussing income tax avoidance).  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation even acknowledged that massive income tax evasion might result from gift 
tax repeal.  Sullivan, supra, at 10.  See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 393, for 
a discussion of potential income tax avoidance if Congress repealed the gift tax.  
There are also difficulties (administratively and politically) in policing income tax 
avoidance by gifting within the family.  John Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals: 
Implications for the Income Tax, 90 TAX NOTES 539 (2001). 
 182 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 396. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id.  On the other hand, expatriation is an extreme step considering recipients 
are receiving the benefits and expatriates are taxed for ten years after leaving 
America.  Fox & Bekman, supra note 181, at 1733-34. 
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assets and after a certain time period return the proceeds to the 
transferor, with appropriate compensation.185  Also, taxpayers could 
create trusts that are not grantor trusts, but still benefit the 
grantors.186  Moreover, Congress was concerned that the repeal of the 
gift tax would harm the progressivity of the tax system.187 
Along with the repeal of the estate and generation-skipping 
taxes in 2010, the 2001 Tax Act established a modified carryover basis 
for inheritances.188  The recipient’s basis is the decedent’s basis in the 
asset or the fair market value of the property at the date of the 
decedent’s death, whichever is less.189  The new scheme also allows a 
“free” basis adjustment of $1.3 million, which the executor can 
allocate to appreciated assets at his discretion.190  The Act provides a 
property basis increase to spouses of $3 million, in addition to the 
$1.3 million basis adjustment, which the executor can allot to 
“qualified spousal property.”191  The Act, however, stipulates that all 
adjustments cannot increase the basis in excess of the assets’ value at 
death (fair market value), ensuring that the basis adjustments cannot 
produce a loss or increase an existing loss.192  The 2001 Tax Act also 
reduced the state death tax credit in 2002, culminating in its repeal 
in 2005.193 
                                                                                                         
 
 185 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 396.  Some claim that income tax 
avoidance would not have occurred even with the repeal of the gift tax.  Fox & 
Bekman, supra note 181, at 1733-36.  The transferor is taking a big risk in 
transferring assets because there are strong incentives for the recipient to keep the 
sale proceeds.  Id.  Moreover, Congress could adopt time periods in which transfers 
of sale proceeds could still produce gain to the transferor.  Id. Supporters of 
retaining the gift tax also claim that wealthy taxpayers could create nongrantor trusts, 
foreign nongrantor trusts, and out-of-state nongrantor trusts to avoid income tax.  
Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 396.  Some commentators have rejected this 
argument.  Fox & Bekman, supra note 181, at 1734-36. 
 186 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 396. 
 187 Steinkamp, supra note 114, at 3 (stating that Congress maintained the gift tax 
out of concern that its repeal would adversely impact the progressivity of the income 
tax). 
 188 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 541, 542 (replacing § 1014 with § 1022 of the 
Internal Revenue Code). 
 189 Id.  The carryover basis will replace the current system, which uses the fair 
market value at date of death to determine the basis of inherited property.  I.R.C. § 
1014. 
 190 Dodge, supra note 89, at 963.  The basis adjustment was enacted as a partial 
replacement of the repealed fair market value basis.  Id. at 962. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 531, 532. 
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IV.   AN INTEGRATED TAX TREATMENT OF GIFTS AND 
INHERITANCES IN A POST-ESTATE TAX WORLD 
Since the passage of the 2001 Tax Act, several members of 
Congress introduced bills to make the repeal of the estate tax 
permanent.194  None of these bills, however, provides a 
comprehensive approach to the tax treatment of gifts and 
inheritances under the Internal Revenue Code;195 all leave the gift tax 
in place.196  Nor do any of the proposals address whether the income 
tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances under § 102 would be justified 
in a post-estate tax world.197  The repeal of § 102 is the more 
important step in providing a sound, comprehensive treatment of 
gifts and inheritances.  However, this only makes sense in an 
environment free of transfer taxes.  Therefore, this Comment will 
first discuss the repeal of the gift tax. 
A. Gift Tax Repeal 
Congress’s decision to retain the gift tax under the 2001 Tax Act 
makes sense in view of the reemergence of the estate tax in 2011.198  
In a world devoid of estate taxes, however, consistent tax policy calls 
for the repeal of the gift tax.199 
The gift tax was, first and foremost, a mechanism designed to 
protect the estate tax.200  Only after Congress realized taxpayers were 
 
 194 In 2002, the House voted to permanently repeal the estate tax; however, the 
Senate failed to muster the 60 votes required in order to make the repeal 
permanent.  Goldsborough,  supra note 9, at B13.  Nevertheless, in January 2003 
alone, three bills were introduced in Congress calling for the permanent repeal of 
the estate tax.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
recent bills.  Some have argued that the repeal of the estate tax should not become 
permanent, stating that “[d]uring the subsequent decade, if repeal becomes 
permanent, the loss to the federal government would be $740 billion.”  
Goldsborough, supra note 9, at B13.  Furthermore, according to the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, “full repeal of the estate tax would cost the federal government $53.4 
billion in 2011, with the figure increasing in subsequent years.”  Deborah McGregor, 
The Americas, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, May 17, 2002, at 3.  Others, however, claim that the 
repeal should become permanent and as quickly as possible.  Lawrence H. Whitman, 
Heritage Foundation Report on Making 2001 Tax Cuts Permanent, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 
230-36 (2002). 
 195 See Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2003, S. 169, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); 
H.R. 139, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); The Death Tax Permanency Act of 2003, H.R. 57, 
108th Cong. § 2 (2003). 
 196 See supra note 195. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See supra Part III for a discussion of the 2001 Tax Act. 
 199 See AICPA Tax Div., Reform of the Estate and Gift Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 307 
(2001) (discussing different tax systems other than the EGT). 
 200 Klein, supra note 23, at 237; see Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax without 
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avoiding the estate tax did Congress adopt the gift tax in 1924, and 
readopt it in 1932, as “necessary to prevent wholesale avoidance of the 
federal estate tax by the rich.”201  If the estate tax repeal becomes 
permanent, mechanisms designed to ensure compliance with it are 
obviously no longer necessary. 
One could argue that the gift tax should remain as an important 
bulwark against income tax avoidance.202  As one commentator states, 
however, it is doubtful “whether retention of the gift tax in an 
environment with no estate tax is a politically viable answer to the 
income tax avoidance issue.”203  Congress will find it difficult to 
explain that “as a result of the ‘tax relief’ provided by [the 2001 Tax 
Act], the constituent has to wait until death to give his farm or small 
business to his children” tax-free.204  Furthermore, concerns regarding 
income tax avoidance would be negated if Congress also repeals the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances under § 102 as 
discussed below, and includes gifts and inheritances in the income 
base of the recipient. 
While the permanent repeal of the estate tax is the chief 
justification for repeal of the gift tax, there is additional policy to 
support its repeal.  It is useful to review the arguments discussed 
earlier205 in favor of an estate tax in order to determine if any 
justifications lend continuing support to the retention of the gift tax, 
even in the absence of an estate tax. 
The gift tax may retain some purpose as an instrument to reduce 
concentrations of wealth.206  But, if the estate tax was unsuccessful in 
equalizing distributions of wealth, it is improbable that the gift tax, 
standing alone, would accomplish that goal.207  Indeed, it is difficult to 
understand why any rational taxpayer, when considering only tax 
consequences, would make a gift during life and incur tax liability 
when, by waiting until death to transfer assets, she could avoid a tax 
 
Resurrecting its Problems, 55 TAX NOTES 1799, 1811 n.31 (1992) (“I would eliminate the 
gift tax too. It is only in the law in order to limit the avoidance of estate tax. If there 
is no estate tax, there is no reason to have a gift tax.”).  See John Buckley, Estate and 
Gift Taxes: What Will Congress Do Next?, 91 TAX NOTES 2069 (2001), for a discussion of 
the protections afforded by the gift tax. 
 201 RATNER, supra note 30, at 449-50 (emphasis added). 
 202 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 101, at 396. 
 203 Buckley, supra note 200, at 2070. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the arguments in favor of the estate tax. 
 206 See supra note 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of the 
EGT on concentrations of wealth. 
 207 Id. 
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burden.208 
It is also highly doubtful that retaining the gift tax would be a 
viable vehicle to generate revenue and help balance the federal 
budget.209  Estate and gift taxes together raise approximately 1.4 
percent of total federal revenue, with the gift tax accounting for only 
a small portion.210  Again, retention of the gift tax, with the 
simultaneous repeal of the estate tax, would bring in even less 
revenue as individuals would wait until death to transfer assets in 
order to avoid tax liability.211  In contrast, if Congress repeals the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances as proposed below,212 
the revenue gain from the inclusion of gifts in gross income may 
offset the loss from the gift tax.213 
The gift tax also does very little to add progressivity to the tax 
system if taxpayers can largely avoid the gift tax.214  Besides, the 
income tax system could provide sufficient progressivity with the 
adoption of higher tax rates and brackets.215 
Ultimately, retention of the gift tax is impossible to justify.  The 
repeal of the estate tax, therefore, necessitates the repeal of the gift 
tax.  Many wealthy individuals may still desire to gift during life 
regardless of tax burdens or incentives.216  These individuals will view 
gift tax retention as “highly inequitable.”217  Further, the repeal of the 
gift tax will prevent any double taxation, real or perceived, that 
results from a federal tax system that includes both an income tax 
and wealth transfer tax.218  The repeal will also add simplicity to the 
current tax system by eliminating the complexities associated with the 
gift tax.219 
 
 208 Lav & Friedman, supra note 102, at 8. 
 209 RATNER, supra note 30, at 449-50. 
 210 In 1995, the gift tax, as part of the unified EGT, raised $1.8 billion.  Bruce R. 
Bartlett, Estate Tax Should be Abolished: NCPA Argues, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 127-36 
(1997). 
 211 Id.; Lav & Friedman, supra note 102, at 8. 
 212 See infra Part IV.B. for a discussion of § 102 repeal. 
 213 See infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of revenue and 
the EGT. 
 214 Schlachter, supra note 15, at 809; Lav & Friedman, supra note 102, at 8. 
 215 Commentators admit that “[t]axation at death could be avoided by replacing 
the estate tax with equally progressive taxes imposed during life.”  Gale & Slemrod, 
supra note 146, at 4.  Similarly, progressivity in the income tax system could offset the 
progressivity that results from the gift tax.  Schlachter, supra note 15, at 788. 
 216 Friedman, supra note 16, at 1986. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Entin, supra note 128, at A18. 
 219 Donald M. Schindel, What To Do With the Transfer Tax System, 95 TAX NOTES 
1819, 1820 (2002). 
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Another important justification for gift tax repeal is that it 
encourages the mobility of capital.220  Retaining the gift tax in an 
estate tax-free world will result in a “lock-in” effect because taxpayers 
will be deterred from gifting assets during life, causing economic 
inefficiency.221  Having reviewed the arguments in favor of an estate 
tax, the investigation of current tax policy calls for the repeal of the 
gift tax in an estate tax-free world. 
B. Repeal of the Income Tax Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances 
Under § 102 
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass,222 the Supreme Court defined 
income as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over 
which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”223  Despite this broad 
concept of income, the income tax has excluded gifts and 
inheritances since the beginning of the modern income tax in 
1913.224  This exclusion dates back to the Civil War tax legislation.225  
The legislative record is silent as to the original justification for this 
exclusion,226 but, since the advent of the estate tax in 1916, the 
existence of this transfer tax has provided a justification for the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances.227  Eliminating the 
EGT shakes the foundation supporting the income tax exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances and allows for a reexamination of the exclusion 
under modern notions of what constitutes income.228  Upon close 
inspection, it is difficult to find any clear argument that supports the 
continuation of the income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances in 
an estate and gift tax-free world.229 
 
 220 Erblich, supra note 94, at 1953-56. 
 221 “A gift tax without an estate tax would favor using one’s estate as the vehicle for 
transferring wealth.” Lav & Friedman, supra note 102, at 8.  It must be noted that the 
impact of the gift tax on the donor’s behavior depends heavily on the gift motive.  
Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth Accumulation 
and Avoidance Behavior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 299, 300 (William 
G. Gale et al. eds., 2001). 
 222 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 223 Id. at 431. 
 224 See supra Part I for a historical overview of gifts and inheritances in American 
history. 
 225 Klein, supra note 23, at 231. 
 226 Harriss, supra note 25, at 532. 
 227 Vasek, supra note 21, at 961. 
 228 Id. (stating that one justification for § 102 is the EGT); see Glenshaw Glass, 348 
U.S. at 431 (defining today’s notion of income). 
 229 Some believe that the tax system should not distinguish gifts from other 
receipts and should treat all enrichment the same.  HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION 30 (1938).  Several scholars have specifically called for the repeal 
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The inclusion of gifts and inheritance in gross income would 
increase the tax base and result in a comprehensive tax system, in 
which taxes are based on the ability to pay.230  Although gifts and 
inheritances may not represent new wealth from an economic 
standpoint, the recipient still receives an “undeniable accession to 
wealth.”231  Likewise, regardless of the motive, the transfer increases 
the recipient’s “economic power to control society’s scarce 
resources.”232  Moreover, as gifts and inheritances are unearned, 
horizontal equity would dictate that this unearned income be treated 
similar to earned income.233  There has never been any apparent 
justification why donative transfers should be treated any differently 
than windfalls, which are included in gross income.234  Simply put, if a 
taxpayer has an accession to wealth, no matter the source, the 
taxpayer should include that accession in gross income. 235 
The inclusion of gifts and inheritances in gross income will also 
match the “official” incidence of taxation of wealth transfers with the 
 
of § 102.  See Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and 
Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978) (arguing for the repeal of § 102 but 
not for the repeal of the estate tax); Galvin, supra note 129, at 1413 (arguing for the 
repeal of § 102); Gac & Brougham, supra note 158 (arguing for the repeal of the 
estate and gift taxes along with the repeal of § 102); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The 
Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 54 
(1992) (arguing for the repeal of § 102).  Professor Kornhauser suggests: 
The time is ripe for a three-prong change in our current treatment 
of gifts: (1) A new provision should be enacted stating that a gift, 
bequest, legacy, or devise is a realization event to the donor/decedent 
and thus taxable to him; (2) Section 102 should be repealed and a new 
section passed explicitly including in the income of a donee or 
inheritor the fair market value of the money and property received; 
and (3) Section 1014 and 1015 should be repealed and a new basis 
provision enacted that would provide for a fair market value basis. 
Id.  See Donaldson, supra note 129, at 560-63, for an overview of the pros and cons of 
the repeal of § 102. 
 230 Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 32. 
 231 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.  Dodge goes as far as stating: “[G]ratuitous 
wealth transfers (as compared to transferred consumption, i.e., ‘support’ in kind) 
represent consumption power of both the transferor and transferee.  Indeed, 
receipts of gifts and bequests, along with other windfall receipts (such as life 
insurance proceeds and lottery winnings), should probably be subject to a surtax.”  
Joseph M. Dodge, A Democratic Tax Manifesto, 66 TAX NOTES 1313, 1325 (1995). 
 232 Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 32. 
 233 Jones, supra note 90, at 794. 
 234 I.R.C. § 61 (2003) (including windfalls in gross income). 
 235 Jones, supra note 90, at 794.  “When a person receives a gift or inheritance, she 
undeniably increases her personal net worth; she is better off with the gift than 
without it.”  Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 1.  “[A]ccessions to wealth, or income—
whether personally consumed, gifted to others, or saved—confer power on the 
owner.”  Id. at 32. 
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“emotional” incidence.236  First, studies demonstrate that most 
taxpayers already believe that gifts and inheritances are included in 
income and that an estate does not comprise a separate taxpaying 
entity.237  Additionally, heirs claim that they, not the estate, pay the tax 
because “[b]y the time the estate tax return is filed, title and 
possession of the property have often passed; the property is ‘theirs;’ 
‘they’ write the check; it is ‘their’ bank balance which decreases.”238  
In other words, the estate tax can be viewed not as taxing the estate as 
a separate taxpaying entity, but rather as taxing the recipients.239 
Including gifts and inheritances in gross income would result in 
a significant increase in tax revenue, more than offsetting the loss 
due to repeal of the EGT.240  Although tax reporting requirements 
and enforcement obligations will arise as a result of § 102 repeal, 
these costs are minimal when compared to the costs associated with 
the current wealth transfer system.241  Specifically, studies have 
demonstrated that the repeal of § 102 would increase adjusted gross 
income by approximately 3-percent by increasing the income tax 
base.242  Assuming an estimated adjusted gross income of 
approximately $3 trillion, the repeal of § 102 would add 
approximately $90 billion to adjusted gross income.243  If the 
government taxed the $90 billion at an average of 20-percent, the 
government would receive $18 billion in additional revenue.244  The 
inclusion of gifts and inheritances, therefore, has a “built-in, 
measurable revenue replacer.”245 
Although the repeal of the estate tax would eliminate revenue 
sharing between the federal government and states utilizing the State 
Death Tax Credit, the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in gross 
income may actually increase states’ revenues.246  The income tax 
 
 236 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 89. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 334. 
 241 See supra note 129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs 
associated with the EGT.  “Repeal of § 102 might wholly or partially supersede other 
revenue measures, such as the income tax on estate and trusts and the estate and gift 
taxes . . . .”  Dodge, supra note 231, at 1325. 
 242 Galvin, supra note 129, at 1419.  Galvin determined these results utilizing the 
data obtained by the Commission to Revise the Tax Structure.  Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Jones, supra note 90, at 797. 
 246 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 100. 
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system of many states mirrors the federal tax system.247  Thus, if the 
federal tax system includes gifts and inheritances in gross income, 
many states may also adopt this inclusion.248 
As discussed earlier, the EGT has failed to reduce concentrations 
of wealth.249  Nevertheless, the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in 
income may succeed where the EGT has failed.250  The EGT “uses a 
delayed penalty on the accumulation of wealth” by focusing on the 
transferor, while the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in the 
recipient’s gross income focuses on the immediate acquisition of 
wealth.251  Additionally, the repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts 
and inheritances may reduce concentrations of wealth by reaching all 
assets “earned, received, or saved.”252  The disincentives of taxation 
may motivate individuals not to earn income; however, the repeal of  
§ 102 involves unearned income.253  Since gifts and inheritances 
involve unearned income, there is no adverse effect on the 
accumulation of earned wealth.254 
The repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances 
also may encourage charitable contributions.  The recipients of gifts 
and inheritances may donate to charities in the year the payment is 
received in order to take a deduction on their income tax returns.255  
Further, without a gift or estate tax, the wealthy may donate earlier.256 
Even if a proposed tax system is sound in theory, a good tax 
system can only be successful if it is administratively feasible.257  An 
income tax that includes gifts and inheritances facilitates compliance 
and enforcement by incorporating the inclusion into the basic 
annual income tax return.258  In order to maximize compliance, the 
 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the failure of 
the EGT to reduce concentrations of wealth. 
 250 Jones, supra note 90, at 798; see Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 102 
(stating that the repeal of § 102 may reduce concentrations of wealth); see also supra 
notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the EGT to combat 
inequalities in wealth). 
 251 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 331. 
 252 Jones, supra note 90, at 798. 
 253 “Unearned income” involves receiving income through means other than 
labor.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (7th ed. 1999). 
 254 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 102. 
 255 Dodge, supra note 229, at 1209. 
 256 Id.  Congress may want to further limit the deduction of charitable 
contributions from income. Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 97. 
 257 KLEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 16-22. 
 258 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 334. 
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government could utilize third party reporting.259  The annual 
inclusion of gifts and inheritances in gross income also results in the 
elimination of cumulative computations, promoting the annual 
accounting principle.260 
A comprehensive income tax system that includes gifts and 
inheritances in gross income is simpler than having two systems, one 
for income tax and one for wealth transfer.261  The repeal of the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances, along with the repeal 
of the EGT, would also simplify the tax system and decrease 
administrative costs by eliminating rate differentials between income 
and wealth transfers.262  Further, the inclusion of gifts and 
inheritances in gross income does not necessitate the intricate 
complexities in legal form, deductions, and credits that are associated 
with the wealth transfer system.263 
The repeal of the income tax exclusion under § 102 may raise 
potential administrative obstacles.264  The greatest difficulty is 
valuation.265  Every asset received would need to be valued, resulting 
in more conflicts between the government and taxpayers.266  
Although valuation problems exist in every tax system, Congress 
could address these concerns in part by enacting an annual exclusion 
 
 259 Most assets are held in some kind of account (i.e., a real estate transfer is 
finalized through deeds).  Andrew J. Hoerner & Lynn V. Edminston, More From the 
NTA: Compliance, Revenue Estimates, Fiscal Federalism, Property Taxes, and Sin Taxes, 45 
TAX NOTES 398, 400 (1989).  Third party reporting could help ensure compliance 
with the repeal of § 102.  See George Guttman, Why Did the K-1 Matching Program Go 
Awry?, 97 TAX NOTES 736, 736 (2002). 
Currently, the most successful information matching program deals 
with Form 1099 information returns concerning interest and 
dividends.  To facilitate the program, the IRS redesigned forms and 
procedures.  Also, changes in the law required that standardized 
information documents from third-party payers such as financial 
institutions had to be submitted in electronic form.  Most of the initial 
matching work has been done through automated computer programs. 
Id.  For example, a brokerage company could complete a form every time real estate 
is transferred (much like the current system associated with dividends).  See George 
Guttman, Current Audit Statistics Make IRS Look Less Effective Than It Is, 90 TAX NOTES 
1593 (2001), for information regarding third party reporting. 
 260 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 91. 
 261 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 333. 
 262 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 91. 
 263 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 333. 
 264 See Smith, supra note 200, at 1804, for detailed criticism of the repeal of § 102. 
 265 Id. at 1804. 
 266 Id. at 1800 (“Where the assets transferred include real estate, closely held 
business interests, art, jewelry or other such unique or rarely traded assets, the range 
of value estimates is often huge.”). 
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similar to that currently provided in the gift tax.267  This would also 
eliminate taxpayers’ concerns about the necessity of including 
transfers such as birthday presents or wedding gifts. 
Liquidity is another potential complication as all transferred 
assets, cash and non-cash, including nonmarketable or difficult-to-
market assets, would be subject to an income tax.268 
These potential problems are minimal when compared to the 
complexities associated with the current wealth transfer system.269  
Deferred tax payments through installment plans could relieve some 
of the immediate tax burden.270  Further, the same liquidity concerns 
are associated with the EGT since the estate may have no choice but 
to sell assets in order to pay the estate tax.271  Yet, at least in the case of 
an income tax inclusion, the recipient can choose whether to borrow 
against and retain the assets, or to sell the assets in order to pay the 
resulting tax liability.272  So while the inclusion of gifts and 
inheritances in gross income raises potential administrative obstacles, 
none of these concerns outweighs the societal benefits that would 
flow from § 102 repeal. 
In order to avoid administrative feasibility concerns, a generous 
exclusion would ensure that only major transfers of wealth are 
included in gross income.  One possibility is the adoption of a 
$10,000 annual exclusion (increased by the cost of living adjustment 
each year), the same amount as the current annual gift tax exclusion, 
because both taxpayers and attorneys are familiar with this level of 
exclusion.273  The exclusion would not only aid in minimizing 
administrative expenses,274 but would also protect lower income 
individuals from being overly burdened by the inclusion.275  In 
 
 267 Id. (recognizing that valuation problems can be “lessened by providing an 
exclusion similar to the present annual exclusion from gift tax”); Charles O. Galvin, 
Burying the Estate Tax: Keeping Ghouls out of the Cemetery: A Reply to Professor Smith, 56 
TAX NOTES 951, 952 (1992) (responding to criticisms of § 102 repeal).  It must be 
noted that if the exclusion were too high, the tax system would again violate 
horizontal equity.  Smith, supra note 200, at 1804. 
 268 Donaldson, supra note 129, at 562. 
 269 See Smith, supra note 200, at 1799, for a detailed criticism of the repeal of § 
102. 
 270 Donaldson, supra note 129, at 562. 
 271 Galvin, supra note 267, at 952. 
 272 Id.  Furthermore, if only the gain is included in gross income, the resulting tax 
liability will be even less.  Id. 
 273 I.R.C. § 2503 (2003) (authorizing a $10,000 gift tax exclusion with increases for 
inflation and cost of living); Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845 (authorizing a 
$11,000 gift tax exclusion for 2003). 
 274 Galvin, supra note 267, at 952. 
 275 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 90. 
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addition, unlimited transfers to spouses would continue to exist 
without taxation because spouses are considered one taxpaying 
entity.276 
While some argue that the repeal of the income tax exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances would violate neutrality by affecting taxpayers’ 
investment decisions, the repeal may actually avoid neutrality 
problems by focusing on the transferee.277  In fact, the exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances actually violates neutrality because sales are 
taxable, while gifts are not taxable to the recipient; thus, more 
taxpayers are induced to make the nontaxable gift disposition than if 
gifts were also taxable.278  This distortion prevents an efficient 
allocation of resources.279  Therefore, the inclusion of gifts and 
inheritances in the recipient’s gross income will promote economic 
efficiency. 280 
Since the repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances would effect many more people than are currently 
paying the estate tax, the American public may resist the repeal.281  If 
Congress eliminated the entire wealth transfer system, however, the 
repeal of § 102 would be more “palatable and politically 
acceptable.”282  The public seems to object much more to so called 
“death taxes” than an income tax which they already pay annually. 
The argument for repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances can also be viewed from a standpoint of timing.  The 
2001 Tax Act eliminates the stepped-up basis for inheritances in 2010 
with the adoption of a carryover basis.283  Thus, the post-estate tax 
regime brought about by the 2001 Tax Act eventually subjects 
transferred gains to the income tax.284  But the Treasury would need 
 
 276 AICPA Tax Div., supra note 199, at 331 (“[B]equests would be entirely tax-free 
since the surviving spouse is a continuation of the original tax unit.”). 
 277 Compare Smith, supra note 200, at 1802 (arguing against the repeal of § 102 
because of neutrality violations), with Donaldson, supra note 129, at 561 (stating 
benefits of § 102 repeal). 
 278 Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 190. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 If Congress repealed § 102, it would need to decide how to handle life 
insurance, employer deferred compensation plans, support payments, and other 
issues associated with trusts. See generally K. Jay Holdsworth et al., Report on Transfer 
Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395 (1988) (responding to the Treasury Department’s 
request for suggestions to reform the transfer tax system). 
 282 Galvin, supra note 129, at 1419. 
 283 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 541, 542 (eliminating I.R.C. § 1014). 
 284 Jones, supra note 90, at 797. 
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to wait for a realization event to occur.285  Hence, without a realization 
event, the government would never collect taxes.286  The repeal of the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances would make the 
transfer the realized event. 
From a tax policy standpoint, every individual is a separate 
taxpaying entity; thus, Congress should require the recipient of the 
gift or inheritance to include the full fair market value of the 
transferred asset in gross income.287  Sound tax policy necessitates a 
full fair market value inclusion because the transfer of gifts and 
inheritances should be treated as an accession to wealth, rather than 
a sale or exchange of capital asset.288  By including the full fair market 
value in gross income, the complexities associated with determining 
the transferor’s basis are avoided.289  As a result of including the full 
fair market value in gross income, the taxpayer would have a full fair 
market value basis going forward.290 
The inclusion of gifts and inheritances in income should not 
result in capital gain treatment.  If gifts and inheritances are treated 
 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 93.  It should be noted that a married 
couple could choose to be viewed as a single taxpaying entity and file their income 
tax return as married filing jointly.  I.R.C. § 1 (2003).  Even if a fair market value 
basis is adopted, a carryover basis may be appropriate for spousal transfers and 
untaxed transfers due to exemption amounts.  Gac & Brougham, supra note 158, at 
93. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id.  Alternatively, Congress could require the recipient to include only the 
appreciation of the gratuitous transfer in income, in effect taxing the recipient on 
the excess of the fair market value of the transferred asset over its adjusted basis in 
the donor’s hands.  Galvin, supra note 129, at 1418 (arguing for an income tax on 
appreciation of gifts or inheritances, but arguing against a carryover basis).  While 
taxpayers prefer a stepped-up basis to carryover basis, taxpayers may prefer a 
carryover basis to the inclusion of inheritances in income in order to maximize 
deferral of taxes.  Vasek, supra note 21, at 966.  Some may argue that adopting a full 
fair market value inclusion results in double taxation of the transferor’s basis.  Id.  
Some believe that the repeal of § 102, without the donor receiving a deduction, is 
not double taxation: 
[I]t is not accurate to say that the gift is taxed twice.  What is taxed is, 
first, the amount earned by the donor and, second, the amount 
transferred to the donee.  The gift is taxed only once, to the donee.  
Thus, a gift is no more subject to double taxation than is a payment for 
personal services, which is also ‘taxed twice’—once when earned by the 
payor and again when received by the payee. 
Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 74 (1990).  To avoid double 
taxation, the recipient could only be taxed on the gain of the asset, allowing the 
recipient a credit for the donor or decedent’s basis.  Gac & Brougham, supra note 
158, at 93. 
 290 Id.; Galvin, supra note 129, at 1418. 
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as windfalls and lottery winnings, the accession should be taxed as 
ordinary income.291  Ordinary tax treatment avoids the difficulties 
associated with deciphering between ordinary and capital treatment 
and other complex distinctions involving current income, 
accumulated income, and gift or bequest corpus.292 
There is no constitutional bar to repealing the income tax 
exclusion of gifts and inheritances dictated by § 102.293  “[T]he fact 
that § 102 is written into the code as an exclusion indicates a long-
standing position of Congress that gifts and bequests could be taxed 
within the purview of the Sixteenth Amendment but for the specific 
statutory expression.”294  Likewise, scholars have demonstrated that 
arguments based on “text, intent, constitutional theory of purpose, 
precedent, and social and policy values” all indicate a willingness to 
include gifts in income due to the broad economic meaning of 
income that has developed in America.295 
CONCLUSION 
The 2001 Tax Act will bring about the temporary repeal of the 
estate tax.296  Strong sentiment exists for making this repeal 
permanent.  If achieved, it will necessitate a complete reexamination 
of the tax treatment of wealth transfers.  It is clear from a historical 
and policy standpoint that repealing the estate tax and not 
addressing the gift tax or income tax exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances under § 102 would result in an inconsistent tax structure 
for the treatment of wealth transfers. 
The gift tax is not necessary to protect a repealed estate tax.  
Ultimately, estate tax repeal, with gift tax retention, will result in 
avoidance of any inter vivos gifting.  This avoidance will prevent the 
reduction of wealth concentrations, restrict progressivity, and hinder 
the raising of revenue.  In addition, the mobility of capital and 
prevention of a lock-in effect demand the repeal of the gift tax. 
The permanent repeal of the estate tax, along with the gift tax, 
necessitates the repeal of the income tax exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances under § 102.  Based on sound tax policy, including 
 
 291 I.R.C. § 61 (authorizing the inclusion of windfalls in income). 
 292 Dodge, supra note 229, at 1180.  On the other hand, capital gain treatment 
may make sense if the recipient is taxed only on the appreciation of the gratuitous 
transfer.  If the asset while in the donor or decedent’s hand would have received 
capital gain treatment, the recipient should also receive capital gain treatment. 
 293 Galvin, supra note 129, at 1419. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 52. 
 296 2001 Tax Act, supra note 1, §§ 511, 521. 
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ability to pay, fairness, and neutrality, the recipient’s income should 
include gifts and inheritances.  Section 102 repeal may also reduce 
concentrations of wealth, encourage charitable contributions, and 
increase federal tax revenue.  Despite any obstacles presented by 
administrative concerns or political opposition, the repeal of § 102 is 
essential to ensure horizontal equity.  Most importantly, without the 
support of a wealth transfer system, the rationale underlying the 
income tax exclusion of gifts and inheritances collapses. 
 
